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Quarterback Tommy DeVito took the snap under center and tried to jam his way in between his offensive line. He only needed a yard. 

Syracuse head coach Dino Babers opted to go for it on 4th-and-1 at the Duke 13-yard-line when leading 14-10 in the second quarter. DeVito failed to get that yard.

The failure does not change the reality of the situation. By choosing to go for it, Babers improved Syracuse’s pre-snap win probability. He prioritized trying for seven points instead of settling for three. 

Recently, with an even more depleted offense, he has not displayed the same aggression. 

In two separate games now, the Orange have been overly conservative with fourth down decisions, and it’s hurt their chances of winning. Syracuse is 1-7, 1-6 Atlantic Coast, and it’s a lost season. Babers needs to be more aggressive on fourth down decision-making to squeeze all the points he possibly can out of his struggling offense. The Orange’s defense has already proven an ability to keep opponents’ out of the end zone, even when faced with shorter fields. They rank second best in points per scoring opportunity allowed in the ACC. 

Even though the Orange haven’t been effective on the fourth down attempts they’ve tried, Babers should go for it more. He needs to give the offense an extra down to potentially find points — and wins — with three games remaining in the 2020 season. 

“They know that we go for it on fourth down,” Babers said. “Sometimes it’s a flow of the game type thing. They need to be ready to put the fire out regardless of what we decide to do on offense. We wish we had a better percentage, but that’s not going to keep us from doing the things we need to do to win the game.” 

Football coaches are typically too conservative with their fourth down decision making. They’ll punt on 4th-and-short in opponent territory. They’ll settle for a field goal in the red zone. The psychology is simple: risk averse decision-making is how we’re usually wired and it’s easy to explain kicking field goals or punting if the game goes wrong. 

If the coach decides to go for it, and fails, they will be incorrectly ridiculed. Too often, the media and fans judge coaches’ decisions based on results, not process. 

There’s been a paradigm shift throughout both the NFL and college football as analytics become a bigger part of football decision-making. In reality, it’s just using additional information to make reasoned decisions. At both levels, coaches are slowly becoming more aggressive. Coaches are punting in opposition territory and on 4th-and-short less, which the math shows hurts the team’s win probability, according to a FiveThirtyEight study of college football 4th down decisions. 

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Yet when the Orange trailed then-No. 1 Clemson by six late in the third quarter, Babers opted to punt on 4th-and-1 from his own 41-yard-line. The defense had played well to that point, but Babers couldn’t reasonably expect his defense to continue holding the Tigers off the scoreboard. 

Play totals are mounting up, time of possession by the opponents’ offenses is wearing the defense down, and the Orange’s offense isn’t good enough in 2020 to justify not trying to steal an extra possession. SU was a 46-point underdog in that game, but Babers’ decision to take the safe route moved them no closer to winning. 

“The whole thing about going for it on 4th down,” Babers said. “Is when everybody in the booth is saying you should go for it, that’s probably when you shouldn’t go for it.”

Clemson would have loved to get the ball back. It was happy with the punt. It didn’t want SU to put any more pressure on by scoring points. 

Still, Babers defended the decision. He said his defense had been playing well, and he’d hoped they would generate another turnover. He didn’t want to put his defense in a tough position. 

There were multiple decisions on Saturday where Babers coached not to lose, instead of coaching to win. The Orange crossed midfield on their second drive of the game, and reached the Eagles’ 45-yard line for a 4th-and-3. According to a 2014 study that analyzed win probability changes and how they’re impacted by fourth down decision making, the outcome is clear: Babers should’ve gone for it.

Computers can’t be the only tool used to make this decision. But the Orange had a 1-6 record at the time, and its offense has struggled to move the ball. On possessions when they do cross midfield, Babers needs to do everything possible to maximize the potential points. By punting, Syracuse sacrificed possession for some field position, which did not matter when the Eagles marched down the field and scored a field goal.

Later in the game, Babers opted to kick field goals on two separate occasions inside the BC 30-yard-line. First, the Orange had a 4th-and-2 at the Eagles’ 17-yard-line. He opted for the field goal to tie the game at three. 

Then, trailing 10-3 midway through the third quarter, the Orange had one of their best offensive drives of the game and reached the Boston College 28-yard-line for a 4th-and-4. Without hesitation, kicker Andre Szmyt kicked the ball through the uprights for a field goal to cut the lead to 10-6. 

“I thought we gave our team a chance to win. We got to the fourth quarter, we lost by three points,” Babers said. 

The problem: SU still needed a touchdown, even after the field goal. Perhaps their best chance to get a touchdown all afternoon was squandered by a lack of aggression. Syracuse didn’t get another first down until its final drive, when the Eagles were in prevent defense up 10 with two minutes remaining.

The Orange’s offense only crossed midfield three times in the opening 58 minutes of Saturday’s game. All three times, Babers was presented with a chance to be aggressive and try to find points. All three times, he chose to take the field goals or punt. He coached hoping that his offense would continue to sustain drives and create scoring opportunities. It didn’t. Just like it hasn’t all season.

If they go for it and succeed in the future, Babers gives his team a better chance to win. And if they fail, Babers might hear it from the fanbase, or even the media. But he won’t hear it from me.

Because he’ll have been right. He’ll have given them a better chance to win.

Anthony Dabbundo is a senior staff writer at The Daily Orange, where his column appears occasionally. He can be reached at amdabbun@syr.edu or on Twitter @AnthonyDabbundo.

Published on November 8, 2020 at 10:57 pm